We study fragments D(k∀) and D(k-dep) of dependence logic defined either by restricting the number k of universal quantifiers or the width of dependence atoms in formulas. We find the sublogics of existential second-order logic corresponding to these fragments of dependence logic. We also show that, for any fixed signature, the fragments D(k∀) give rise to an infinite hierarchy with respect to expressive power. On the other hand, for the fragments D(k-dep), a hierarchy theorem is otained only in the case the signature is also allowed to vary. For any fixed signature, this question is open and is related to the so-called Spectrum Arity Hierarchy Conjecture.
INTRODUCTION
Dependence logic [Väänänen 2007 ] extends first-order logic by dependence atomic formulas =(x 1 , . . . , x n )
the intuitive meaning of which is that the value of x n is completely determined by the values of x 1 , . . . , x n−1 . While it is known that dependence logic (D) is equivalent to existential second-order logic (ESO) (and thus to NP over finite structures [Fagin 1974]) in expressive power, not much is known about the expressive power of its fragments. On the other hand, various fragments of ESO have been studied and the expressive power of the fragments of ESO is quite well understood (see, e.g., Ajtai [1983] , Grädel [1992] , Olive [1998] , Grandjean and Olive [2004] , Durand et al. [1998] , and Gottlob et al. [2004] ). In this article we take the first steps towards charting the expressive power of fragments of dependence logic. The fragments studied in this article are defined by restricting the number of universal quantifiers or the width of the dependence 1 f (k∀, ∃ * ) of ESO which corresponds, modulo skolemizing first-order existential quantifiers, to a fragment of ESO f (k∀) in sentences of which the quantified functions have only very simple occurrences.
We also consider the expressive power of the logics D(k∀) and D(k-dep) over finite structures and investigate in particular whether, for varying k, these fragments form a strict hierarchy of expressivity. We recall a result of Ajtai [1983] showing that in ESO f (k-ary) even cardinality of a k + 1-ary relation cannot be expressed. Our results imply that the same holds for the logic D (k-dep) and that the hierarchy is strict when k is less than the maximal arity of a relation in the signature. For the general case, we give some evidence that proving the strictness of the hierarchy may be hard since our results imply that, in the case τ = ∅, this question is equivalent to the Spectrum Arity Hierarchy Conjecture [Fagin 1993 ] that asks if there are sets of positive integers (spectra) definable by first-order sentences (the spectrum of a sentence φ is the set of finite cardinalities in which φ has a model) with predicates of maximal arity k+1 which are not definable by sentences with predicates of arity k.
On the other hand, Grandjean and Olive [2004] showed that, for any signature τ , ESO f (k∀) = ESO f (k-ary, k∀) = NTIME RAM n k , where NTIME RAM (n k ) denotes the family of classes of τ -structures that can be recognizes by a non-deterministic Random Access Machine in time O(n k ). The hierarchy theorem of Cook [1973] implies that these classes form a strict hierarchy with respect to k and hence the same holds for the logics ESO f (k∀). We show that
implying a hierarchy theorem for the logics D(k∀).
This article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review some basic properties and results regarding dependence logic. We also recall some relevant results characterizing subclasses of NP in terms of fragments of ESO. Section 3 contains our main results connecting fragments of dependence logic with that of ESO. In Section 4, we use our results to identify expressibility hierarchies within dependence logic. Finally, in Section 5, we state a couple of straightforward consequences of our results for IFlogic and the open formulas of dependence logic.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section we first define dependence logic and recall some basic results on it. Then we review results in computational complexity and descriptive complexity theory that will be needed.
Dependence Logic
We begin with the syntax of dependence logic.
Definition 2.1 ( [Väänänen 2007]) . The syntax of D extends the syntax of FO, defined in terms of ∨, ∧, ¬, ∃ and ∀, by atomic dependence formulas of the form
where t 1 , . . . , t n are terms. For a signature τ , D[τ ] denotes the set of τ -formulas of D.
The meaning of the dependence formula (2) is that the value of the term t n is functionally determined by the values of the terms t 1 , . . . , t n−1 . Hence the meaning of the formula =(t) is that the value of the term t depends on nothing, that is, is constant. As a singular case we have =(), which we take to be universally true.
Definition 2.2. The set Fr(φ) of free variables of a formula φ ∈ D is defined as for first-order logic, except that we have the new case
where Var(t i ) is the set of variables occurring in term t i . If Fr(φ) = ∅, we call φ a sentence.
The semantics of D is formulated using the concept of a Team. Let A be a model with domain A. Assignments of A are finite mappings from variables into A. The value of a term t in an assignment s is denoted by t A s . If s is an assignment, x a variable, and a ∈ A, then s(a/x) denotes the assignment (with domain dom(s) ∪ {x}) that agrees with s everywhere except that it maps x to a. For an assignment s, and a tuple of variables x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), we sometimes denote the tuple (s(x 1 ), . . . , s(x n )) by s(x). Definition 2.3. Let A be a set and {x 1 , . . . , x k } a finite (possibly empty) set of variables.
-A team X of A with domain dom(X ) = {x 1 , . . . , x k } is any set of assignments from the variables {x 1 , . . . , x k } into the set A.
-The relation rel(X ) ⊆ A k corresponding to X is defined as
-For a function F : X → A, we define
s ∈ X and a ∈ A}.
We are now ready to define the semantics of dependence logic. Signatures τ are assumed to be finite and they may contain constant, relation and function symbols. The arity of τ is the maximum of the arities of the relation and function symbols in τ . In this article we consider only formulas in negation normal form (NNF), that is, negation is allowed to appear only in front of atomic formulas. This is not a restriction since any formula of dependence logic can be transformed into negation normal form [Väänänen 2007 ]. Below, atomic formulas and their negations are called literals, and A |= s φ refers to satisfaction in first-order logic.
Definition 2.4 ( [Väänänen 2007]) . Let A be a model and X a team of A. The satisfaction relation A |= X φ is defined as follows:
-If φ is a first-order literal, then A |= X φ iff for all s ∈ X : A |= s φ.
Here, we assume that the domain of X contains the variables free in φ. Finally, a sentence φ is true in a model A (A |= φ) if A |= {∅} φ.
Next we define the concepts of logical consequence and equivalence for formulas of dependence logic.
Definition 2.5. Let φ and ψ be formulas of dependence logic. The formula ψ is a logical consequence of φ, φ ⇒ ψ, if for all models A and teams X , with Fr(φ) ∪ Fr(ψ) ⊆ dom(X ), and A |= X φ we have A |= X ψ. The formulas φ and ψ are logically equivalent, φ ≡ ψ, if φ ⇒ ψ and ψ ⇒ φ.
Basic Properties of Dependence Logic
In this section we recall some basic properties of dependence logic.
Let X be a team with domain {x 1 , . . . , x k } and V ⊆ {x 1 , . . . , x k }. Denote by X V the team {s V : s ∈ X } with domain V. The following lemma shows that the truth of a formula depends only on the interpretations of the variables occurring free in the formula. A |= X φ ⇐⇒ (A, rel(X )) |= ψ. Kontinen and Väänänen [2009] show that the converse also holds. 
Theorem 2.10 shows that formulas of dependence logic correspond in a precise way to the negative fragment of ESO and are therefore very expressive. Furthermore, the results of Kontinen [2010] discussed in the Introduction show that already for certain quantifier-free formulas φ ∈ D, the corresponding sentence ψ ∈ ESO (see Theorem 2.9) defines a NP-complete problem. On the other hand, if we restrict attention to formulas that do not contain dependence atomic formulas as subformulas, we lose much of the expressive power. 
The following proposition shows that both the existential fragment of D, and the fragment allowing only dependence atoms of width 1 (i.e., dependence atoms = (t 1 )), collapse also to first-order logic. Then φ is equivalent to a first-order sentence.
PROOF. The result of Case 2 has been shown by Galliani [2012] . He studies the fragment of D allowing only dependence atoms of width 1 and shows (independently of this article) that, from sentences, they can be eliminated using existential quantification in a similar fashion to Lemma 3.2.
Case 1 is proved using induction on φ. It is straightforward to show that for all A and assignments s:
where φ * is obtained from φ by replacing dependence atoms in terms of a universally true formula .
In the next lemma, we list certain properties of dependence logic that will be used later.
LEMMA 2.14. Formulas of dependence logic satisfy the following properties: PROOF. For 1 and 3 see Lemma 3.23, for 2 and 4 see Exercise 3.49, and for 5 see Exercise 3.51 in Väänänen [2007] . Finally, we note that 6 is based on the strong compositionality of dependence logic (see Lemma 3.25 in Väänänen [2007] for the exact formulation). The assumption ¬ψ ≡ ¬ψ will not be relevant for our purposes.
We end this section by defining the fragments of dependence logic and ESO that will be discussed in the following sections. 
in which the relation symbols X i are at most k-ary and ψ is a first-order formula. -Denote by ESO f (k-ary) the class of ESO-sentences
in which the function symbols f i are at most k-ary and ψ is a first-order formula.
-Denote by ESO f (k-ary, m∀) the class of ESO-sentences in Skolem Normal Form
in which the function symbols f i are at most k-ary and r ≤ m.
-Denote by ESO f (m∀) the class of ESO-sentences in Skolem Normal Form
where r ≤ m.
By abuse of terminology, we identify these classes of sentences with the classes of properties they define.
Finally we define some further fragments of ESO that will play a central rôle in the results of Section 3.2. The difference, for example, between the sentences of ESO f (k-ary) and ESO 1 f (k-ary) defined below is that in the latter fragment the quantified functions f i are only allowed to have occurrences of the form f i (x i ) in the formula, where x i is a tuple of pairwise distinct variables. 
where Q i ∈ {∃, ∀}, and the number of i, We identify these classes of sentences with the classes of properties they define.
It is worth noting that the definition of the logic ESO 1 f (k∀) forces the functions f i to be at most k-ary, whereas in ESO 1 f (k∀, ∃ * ), the functions f i can have arity greater than k.
Background in Complexity
In this section we review some concepts and results in complexity theory and descriptive complexity theory. We assume that the reader is familiar with the basics of computational complexity theory. Descriptive complexity theory studies and applies logical methods in the area of computational complexity theory. The seminal result in the field was Fagin's [1974] characterization of NP in terms of problems describable in ESO. Since then, most of the central complexity classes have been given such logical characterization. Fagin's characterization of NP implies, by Theorem 2.8, that
that is, for every signature τ , and every class K ⊆ Str(τ ) of finite structures:
* is a language encoding the class K.
In this article we are interested in fragments of dependence logic and NP. We denote by NTIME(n k ) the class of languages that can be recognized by some nondeterministic Turing Machine in time O(n k ). Lynch [1982] observed that the exponent k in NTIME(n k ) corresponds roughly to the arity of relations quantified in formulas of ESO: In Theorem 2.17, the first-order part of φ has the quantifier prefix ∀ * ∃ * . Grandjean and Olive Olive 1998, 2004; Olive 1998 ], showed that, when considering Random Access Machines as the computation model, a tighter correspondence can be proved and, actually, an exact characterization of fragments of NP on RAM's can be obtained.
Grandjean and Olive consider τ -NRAM's, nondeterministic RAM's that take an arbitrary τ -structure as input (see Grandjean and Olive [2004] for a complete description of this model). A problem L on τ -structures is in the class NTIME RAM (n k ), k ∈ N * , if there exists a τ -NRAM M that recognizes every structure of L and such that: each computation of M on a structure A with domain A of size n uses only integers in O(n k ) (for address or register contents) and stops after O(n k ) steps. To count the cost of the computation, the uniform cost measure is adopted.
Olive proved the following result for signatures consisting of unary functions [Olive 1998 ]. It was later generalized for any kind of input structures in Grandjean and Olive [2004] . THEOREM 2.18. Let k ∈ N * and let τ be any signature. Over τ -structures:
It is worth noting that, even for k = 1, no built-in relations need to assumed in this theorem (the result Olive [1998] used built-in relations in the case k = 1). Note that n is the domain size. Hence, if the maximal arity in τ is greater than k, then the number of steps in a O(n k ) computation is less than the input size. Let us now recall the hierarchy theorem for nondeterministic time by Cook [1973] . THEOREM 2.19. for every k ∈ N * : NTIME RAM n k < NTIME RAM n k+1 .
The lemma below shows that the classical hierarchy result also applies to the "sublinear" case. This lemma is in a sense a logical version of the separation result in Grandjean and Olive [2004] . LEMMA 2.20. For all h, k ∈ N * with k < h and for every signature τ of arity h, it holds:
PROOF. We prove the result in the case of a signature τ restricted to one function symbol only (for one relation symbol the proof is analogous). Therefore, the separation result follows for all richer signatures. Let P be the set of h-ary structures A on domain A (identified with {0, . . . , n − 1}) over one function F and one constant 0 defined by: F(a 1 , . . . , a k+1 , 0, . . . , 0) = 0 and arbitrary otherwise. In some sense, the functions F in structures of P are constant on A k+1 values which are chosen for convenience on the first k + 1 coordinates. Clearly, P ∈ ESO f ((k + 1)∀). Suppose now that P is definable in ESO f (k∀) by a formula below:
where the f i are functions (we do not even need to suppose they are k-ary). Let n ∈ N and let A ∈ P on domain A with |A| = n. By hypothesis, A |= . Then, there exists f 1 , . . . , f t on A such that:
Let us consider the propositional constraint φ:
The formula φ is of size O(n k ). Let now L be the set of h-ary tuples (a i 1 , . . . , a i h ) such that F (a i 1 , . . . , a i 
. . .
Hence,
and then A |= . But, since F (b 1 , . . . , b k+1 , 0, . . . , 0) = 0, then A ∈ P. This contradicts our assumption that P is definable by .
Hence, this last result, together with Theorem 2.19 implies the following corollary.
COROLLARY 2.21. Let τ be any signature and k ∈ N * . On τ -structures, ESO f (k∀) < ESO f ((k + 1)∀).
RELATIONS BETWEEN FRAGMENTS OF D AND ESO
In this section we study the relationships between fragments of dependence logic and ESO. We consider first the logics D(k-dep).
The logics D(k-dep)
In this section we consider the logics D(k-dep). The case k = 0 is solved by Proposition 2.13, hence we assume that k ≥ 1.
The following proposition gives us a direct correspondence between certain sentences of D and ESO. This correspondence is slightly more general compared to that of Theorem 6.15 [Väänänen 2007] PROOF. We will show that the sentences φ and χ are equivalent. Let A be arbitrary and suppose that A |= φ.
This implies that there is a team X such that
where X is constructed by evaluating the quantifier prefix Q 1 x 1 . . . Q m x m . Furthermore, (3) implies that there are functions F i :
where X 0 = X , and X i = X i−1 (F i /y i ). By the first conjunct in (4), the values F i (s) of F i are determined by the values s assigns to the variables in z i . We can now choose functions g i : A |z i | → A satisfying g i (a) = F i (s) for all a such that a = s(z i ) for some s ∈ X i−1 . We will next show that
Recall that θ is a first-order formula of dependence logic and hence, by Theorem 2.12, (5) holds iff (A, g 1 , . . . , g n ) |= s θ for each s ∈ X . We can now show, using induction on the construction of θ , that for all s ∈ X n (recall that dom(s) = {x 1 , . . . , x m , y 1 , . . . , y n }) it holds that
where s = s {x 1 , . . . , x m }. The key to this result is the fact that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the interpretation of the variable y i and the term f i z i agree:
This implies, for any complex term t(y 1 , . . . , y n ), that the interpretations of the terms t(y 1 , . . . , y n ) and t f 1 z 1 /y 1 , . . . , f n z n /y n agree for s and s , respectively. With these observations, the induction in (6) is straightforward. Now, by (4) and Proposition 2.7, for all s ∈ X n , it holds that
Hence, by (6) and Theorem 2.12 again, we get that
This implies
and, finally, that
The implication "χ ⇒ φ" follows by essentially reversing these steps. Remark that by construction, for each symbol f i , there exists i 1 , . . . , i p , pairwise distinct, such that all terms and subterms with f i as the outermost symbol in χ are of the form f i (x i 1 , . . . , x i p ). Hence, the reciprocal result follows analogously.
Our goal is to find a subclass of ESO corresponding to D(k-dep).
We will use Proposition 3.1 to achieve this. The following lemma allows us to transform a sentence in prenex normal form to the form required in Proposition 3.1. PROOF. The claim is proved using induction on the formula ψ. If ψ is a first-order literal then the claim holds trivially. If ψ is of the form = (z 1 , . . . , z m ), then we can transform ψ into the following equivalent form satisfying the claim:
Note that we do not have to consider the case of ¬ =(z 1 , . . . , z m ) since this formula is equivalent to ⊥. Assume then that ψ := φ 1 ∨ φ 2 . By the induction hypothesis
and
We may assume that the variables y 1 , . . . , y n and y n+1 , . . . , y n+m do not appear in Formulas (8) and (7), respectively. Therefore, by Lemma 2.6 it follows that φ 2 ≡ ∃y 1 . . . ∃y n φ 2 ,
Using these equivalences, we may now use successively clause 1 of Lemma 2.14 to show that ψ is equivalent to the formula ψ *
Next we will show how to transform the quantifier-free part χ of ψ * into the desired form
Let A be a model and X a team whose domain consists of the free variables of ψ * . Suppose A |= X ψ * . Then, there are functions
. By the semantics of disjunction, there are teams
Since the variables y n+1 , . . . , y n+m do not appear in the formula in (9), it is obvious that we can modify the values of these variables in Y to get Y such that A |= Y θ 1 , and
More precisely, we do the following (note that we are modifying the values of the func- 
For the converse, it is immediate that the formula in (10) logically implies ψ * . Therefore it is logically equivalent to our original formula ψ.
The case ψ := φ 1 ∧ φ 2 is proved analogously. By the induction hypothesis
Now, analogously to the previous case, we get that ψ is equivalent to the formula ψ * ψ * := ∃y 1 . . . ∃y n ∃y n+1 . . .
Here we use successively clause 2 of Lemma 2.14. Now the quantifier-free part of ψ * can be directly transformed to the desired form.
It is important to note that the width of the dependence atoms in ψ do not change in the transformation of Lemma 3.2. We are now ready to characterize the fragment of ESO corresponding to the logic D(k-dep).
We prove this by successive transformations on φ ∈ D(k-dep). By case 5 of Lemma 2.14 we can transform φ into prenex normal form. In this transformation, we might have to replace some bound variables by new ones, but the width of the dependence atoms do not change in the transformation. So φ is equivalent to a sentence of the form
where Q i ∈ {∃, ∀} and θ is a quantifier-free formula. We may further assume that all the dependence atomic subformulas of θ are of the form =(z 1 , . . . , z p ) for some pairwise distinct variables z 1 , . . . , z p ; if θ has a subformula =(t 1 , . . . , t p ), we may pass on to the sentence
Hence we may assume that the sentence (11) satisfies this assumption. Note that, to ensure this property, only new existentially quantified variables need at worst to be introduced. Next we use Lemma 3.2 to transform θ into an equivalent form
where θ * is a quantifier-free formula without dependence atoms. Using 6 of Lemma 2.14, it follows that φ is equivalent to the sentence φ
where each variable in the tuple z j is in {x 1 , . . . , x m }. Proposition 3.1 now implies that φ is equivalent to the ESO f (k-ary)-sentence χ
where θ is obtained from θ * by replacing every occurrence of y i by the term
We will show that every sentence ψ ∈ ESO f (k-ary) can be transformed into an equivalent sentence resembling χ ∈ ESO 1 f (k-ary) in Proposition 3.1. First of all, we may certainly assume that the first-order part of ψ is in prenex normal form, that is,
where θ is a quantifier-free formula. We still need to make sure that, ( ) for each symbol f i , there exists i 1 , . . . , i j , pairwise distinct, such that all terms and subterms in θ with f i as the outermost symbol are of the form f i (x i 1 , . . . , x i j ).
This can be accomplished analogously to Theorem 6.15 in Väänänen [2007] . One by one, we replace each occurrence of every term f (t 1 , . . . , t j ) in θ by a new term f (z 1 , . . . , z j ), where z 1 , . . . , z j is a fresh tuple of pairwise distinct variables and use the equivalence of θ ( f (t 1 , . . . , t j )) and
In this way, θ is transformed to an equivalent formula of the form ∀zθ such that θ contains only simple terms of the form f (z 1 , . . . , z j ). If now θ contains two occur- 
where ψ is quantifier free. Let us call so(φ) the set of existentially quantified function symbols that appear in φ. By Theorem 2.18 we can also suppose that the functions of so(φ) are of arity k. By introducing new function symbols, we will normalize the formula φ step by step.
(1) For every term f (t 1 , . . . , t m ) in φ, which is not of the form f (x 1 , . . . , (x) , . . . , h m (x)) using the equivalence:
After these transformations, the composition depth of all terms is bounded by 2. (2) Transform φ in such a way that no function symbol appears both as an inner and an outer function symbol even in different composed terms. This can be done by systematically renaming all inner terms g i (x) by a new term h i (x) with h i ∈ so(φ) and using the equivalence:
(3) Finally, for convenience, one forces that for each function f ∈ so(φ), there is at least one occurrence of the term f (x). For that, it suffices to add in conjunction with the formula a dummy equality f (x) = h(x) where h ∈ so(φ).
We are now ready to make the final transformation on φ. Note that those f ∈ so(φ) that only appear as an inner symbol in composed terms, have only occurrences of the form f (x 1 , . . . , x k ) in φ. Therefore, it suffices to consider f ∈ so(φ) having at least one occurrence of the form f (g 1 (x), . . . , g k (x)) in φ. Let term( f ) be the set of terms involving f . The elements τ 1 ( f ),. . . ,τ m f ( f ) of term( f ) are of the form
where all functions g i, j are in (so(φ)∪{ pr 1 , . . . , pr k })\{ f } where each pr j is the projection function on the jth argument. Without loss of generality, we may suppose that τ 1 ( f ) = f (x 1 , . . . , x k ). Let us introduce new functions symbols h 1 , . . . , h m f not yet in so(φ). Then, the following equivalence holds:
where ψ * is obtained from ψ by replacing every occurrence of τ 1 ( f ) by f (x ) and every occurrence of τ i ( f ), for i > 1, by h i (x). Note that in the original φ, all simple terms involving f (i.e., not as an outermost symbol in a composition) are all already of the form f (x) (from the normalization process). They can then be transformed into f (x ) directly. This step is repeated for every function of so(φ) appearing as an outer symbol in a composed term.
Now we turn to the characterization of the logics D(k∀).
The following lemma will be used.
PROOF. By Theorem 3.8 and Proposition 3.5, it holds that D(k∀) ≤ ESO f (k∀). The following chain of inclusions now hold using Corollary 2.21 and 2.18:
A hierarchy result for D(k∀) can also be stated. PROOF. Again, using Theorem 3.8 and Proposition 3.5, it holds that
. By the "hierarchy" Corollary 2.21, ESO f (k∀) < ESO f ((k + 1)∀) and from Proposition 3.6, it holds:
Then, the result follows by applying Theorem 3.8 again.
The hierarchy on D(k∀) is not tight. However, the following is easily seen to be true (in the results that follow, that do not hold for all signatures or every value of k, we make explicit the parameter τ in the notation). 
. Since the number of pairwise disjoint intervals of the form (k, 2k + 1) is infinite, the result follows.
We now turn back to logics D(k-dep). The time hierarchy theorem can be used in the context of the logics ESO f (k∀) but not directly with the logics ESO f (k-ary) or ESO(k-ary). Ajtai [1983] showed that also the logics ESO(k-ary) form a strict hierarchy with respect to k if the signature is allowed to vary. By an easy reduction, one can improve the result to show that it is also the case for the logics ESO f (k-ary) (see Durand et al. [1998] for the separation of the two first levels). To summarize: THEOREM 4.4 ([AJTAI 1983]) . Let R be a k + 1-ary relation symbol. Then the property "|R| even" cannot be defined in the logic ESO f (k-ary).
Since "|R| even" is expressible in ESO((k + 1)-ary), we get that, for all k
where τ k+1 = {R} and R is k + 1-ary. By Theorem 3.3, the logics D(k-dep) also form a hierarchy with respect to expressive power using Theorem 4.4.
PROOF. The claim directly follows from Theorems 3.3 and 4.4.
This result provides a kind of "subdiagonal" hierarchy when the maximal arity of a relation in the signature is greater than the authorized arity of a dependence atomic formula. Could a better result be proved? In particular, is it true that for every signature τ and all k,
? By Theorem 3.3, such a result would imply that ESO f (k-ary) < ESO f ((k + 1)-ary) for every signature. Although it is reasonably conjectured to be true, such a result is not yet known. In the particular case of τ = ∅, it would imply that there exists sets of integers definable by first-order sentences (i.e., which are spectra of first-order sentences) with predicates of maximal arity k + 1 which are not definable by sentences with predicates of arity k. This latter question is left open in Fagin [1975] (it concerns the so-called Spectrum Arity Hierarchy, see also Fagin [1993] ) and has not received a satisfiable answer since then despite numerous efforts. Proving an equivalent hierarchy for D(k-dep) is a challenging and difficult task with consequences to fields beyond dependence logic.
APPLICATIONS
In this section we briefly discuss certain applications and consequences of our results to IF logic and the open formulas of dependence logic. We begin with the case of IF logic.
The syntax of IF logic (we follow the formulation of Caicedo et al. [2009] disregarding the slashed conjunctions and disjunctions) extends the syntax of FO by slashed quantifiers ∃x/W and ∀x/W, where W is a finite set of variables. Since we are interested only in formulas in negation normal form, we can drop the slashed universal quantifiers from our syntax. Satisfaction for IF-formulas is defined otherwise as in Definition 2.4, except that we have a new case for the quantifier ∃x/W.
Definition 5.1. Let A be a model, X a team of A, and
The slashed existential quantifier ∃x/W is now interpreted as follows:
for some W-independent function F : X → A.
We will next show that our results regarding the logics D(k∀) can be directly transferred to the context of IF logic. For that end, denote by IF(k∀) the class of NNF sentences φ of IF logic whose every variable is quantified exactly once (no reusing of variables), and φ contains at most k occurrences of the quantifier ∀. PROOF. The claim follows from the results of Hodges and Väänänen [2010] . The idea is that any sentence of IF logic can be translated into an equivalent sentence of socalled Backslash-Logic with the same number of universal quantifiers, and vice versa. Furthermore, such formula translations are also shown to exist between backslashlogic and dependence logic. By Proposition 2.7 (downward closure) it is easy to show that ψ satisfies the claim.
Proposition 5.4 gives us an upper bound for the complexity of the property defined by φ. Note that the number of universal quantifiers in the translating sentence ψ is bigger than in φ. However, for instance, the fact that already certain quantifier-free formulas of D define NP-complete properties of teams (discussed in the Introduction) indicates that the free variables of a formula have to be taken into account when determining the complexity of a formula.
Proposition 5.4, together with Theorems 2.18 and 3.8, immediately implies the following complexity upper bound for open formulas. PROPOSITION 5.5. Let τ be a signature and φ a D[τ ]-formula with k universal quantifiers and s free variables. Then the property (i.e., the class of τ ∪{R}-structures) defined by φ is in NTIME RAM (n k+s ).
CONCLUSION
We have pinned down the fragments of ESO corresponding to the fragments D(k∀) and D(k-dep) of D. (Figure 1 summarizes the main relationships between logics considered in this paper.) Our results explain how important syntactic parameters, the maximal width of dependence atoms, and the number of universal quantifiers in a sentence, reflect on its data complexity. We also showed that fixing either of the parameters will lead to a loss in expressive power. The following questions remain open. Note that Corollary 4.3 does not answer Question 1 since it shows that for every signature the inclusion is strict for inifinitely many k but not for all k yet. It is worth
